Government Opportunism in Public-Private Partnerships英文文献资料.pdf

GOVERNMENT OPPORTUNISM IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS VANESSA VALERO European University Institute Abstract This paper analyzes the contracting out of public services through public-private partnerships (PPP) subject to gov- ernment opportunism. In PPP, the building of public infra- structure and the provision of related services are procured through only one contract. On the one hand, such bundling of tasks provides incentives to invest in the infrastructure to minimize the cost of providing public services over the long term. On the other hand, it creates incentives for the gov- ernment to behave opportunistically, by not respecting the terms of the long-term contractual agreement. Contrarily, in the traditional procurement (TP), the public service pro- vision tasks are contracted out separately. The purpose of this paper is two fold. First, we show that government com- mitment not to engage in opportunistic behavior is the key factor determining the cost efficiency of PPP. Second, we specify the economic determinants of government’s choice between PPP and TP under government opportunism. 1. Introduction The last three decades have witnessed a trend toward private sector involve- ment in the provision of public services. Governments are increasingly Vanessa Valero, European University Institute, Via delle Fontanelle 10, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy (vanessa.valero@eui.eu).