权利失衡条件下的供应链的均衡分析.docVIP

PAGE 2 权力失衡条件下的供应链结构的均衡分析 摘要：本文研究多个供应商销售给同一个零售商产品时，渠道权利对供应链稳定性的影响，传统上通过运用一至两级stackelberg非合作博弈论模型分析了具有共同决策权的多供应商这种供应链。在本文中，我们将放宽这一假设，通过博弈论模型来考查供应商作为Stackelberg领导者的情况。因此，我们分析新的供应链结构并且引入结构优势的概念，用新方法分析供应链的影响具有实际意义。这样一来，决策者可以应用结构优势这一概念来确定是否存在比其他更稳定的供应链，即代理或者整个供应链极少出现权利的重新配置。我们发现在现行需求环境下无论产品的竞争如何，权利不平衡都会引起供应链效益的显著下降，代理商的权利越平衡他们的效益就越高。在通常情况下，制造商Stackelberg模型和零售商Stackelberg模型都不是稳定的结构，只有在代理们权利相等时这种结构才是最稳定的和绩效最高的。 关键词：权利优势；供应链稳定； 博弈论 Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance Abstract： This paper investigatesthe implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one- or two-stage Stackelberg non-cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced (equal) decision-making power. In this paper, we relax this assumption and formulate gametheoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the Stackelberg leader. Consequently, we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance, a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications. Thus, a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others, i.e., less prone to power reconfigurations, at both agent and group level. We find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits, and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear, regardless of product competition. It develops that neither the Manufacturer Stackelberg nor the Retailer Stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting, but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance. 1 引言 我们研究多供应商/制造商给相同的下游公司或零售商提供各种可替代产品或部件的供应链。这种多代理的供应链在制造行业，零售行业和服务行业都是很普遍的。制造商很少在企业内部生产所有的零部件