银行与中小企业信贷博弈分析.docVIP

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  • 2019-09-24 发布于湖北
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摘要:中小企业是我国国民经济的重要组成部分,然而银行对中小企业存在严重的“惜贷”行为。本文通过建立博弈模型,分析产生这一问题的原因及约束条件。结论是,在静态博弈的条件下,中小企业的信用行为受中小企业自身及商业银行的期望效用等因素的影响;在一次动态博弈中,中小企业有可能产生失信的机会主义行为;在无限重复博弈中,守信是中小企业的最优策略。最后,本文对此现象相应提出了一些对策。 关键词:博弈 银行贷款 中小企业 The analysis of game theory between commerical banks and small and medium scale enterprises Abstract: Small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) is an important part of national economy in China, however, they are very hard to loan from the bank. This article analyses the reasons and constraints of this problem through the game model. The conclusion is that under the condition of static game,

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