Reactions to corporate insider’s transactions Do legal stock market disclosure rules have an impact英文精品课件.pdf
- 1、本文档共26页,可阅读全部内容。
- 2、原创力文档(book118)网站文档一经付费(服务费),不意味着购买了该文档的版权,仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用,不得用于商业用途,未经授权,严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等,侵权必究。
- 3、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传,本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺!文档内容仅供研究参考,付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费,意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险,本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务;查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档,您可以点击 这里二次下载。
- 4、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等,请点击“版权申诉”(推荐),也可以打举报电话:400-050-0827(电话支持时间:9:00-18:30)。
查看更多
Eur J Law Econ (2015) 40:247–272
DOI 10.1007/s10657-014-9475-7
Reactions to corporate insider’s transactions: Do legal
stock market disclosure rules have an impact?
Caspar Rose • Nicolai Søpstad
Published online: 29 November 2014
Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract We test the impact on security prices of top manager’s requirement’s to
disclose their own share transactions in the firm. Specifically we study whether buy
or sales transactions convey relevant information for market participants thereby
studying the effects of legal stock market disclosure rules. Based on a compre-
hensive collection of stock market announcements from Danish CEOs and chairmen
we find that insiders’ transactions influence share prices. However, it appears that
there is a surprisingly difference, as buy transactions by chairmen have a much
higher impact compared to CEO transactions, which to our knowledge have not
been noticed already by others. Thus, our event study shows that the Danish stock
market seems to be efficient in the semi-strong from.
Keywords Disclosure rules Insider’s transactions Event study
Signaling and stock market efficiency
JEL Classification K10 K14 K22 M20 G30
1 Introduction
‘‘The combination of high activity and a high buy to sale ratio shows
that insiders have good faith in the future development of their
C. Rose (&) N. Søpstad
Department of International Economics and Management, Center for Corporate Governance,
Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 24A, 1. sal, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
e-mail: @cbs.dk
123
248 Eur J Law Econ (2015) 40:247–272
respective companies’’ 1 (Tyvand, Dagens Næringsliv, 26th of June
文档评论(0)