并购的动机和后果概述.pptxVIP

并购的动机和后果Incentive for and consequences of MA1. Positive incentivesSynergiesReduce agency costTransaction costEconomy of scale Economy of scopemanagement1.1 降低代理成本股权分散经理人持股比例较低约束和激励不足集体行动的逻辑股东监督的动机弱化并购成为一种替代机制1.2 降低交易成本Coase (1937)a. Fundamental questions(1) What determines the size of a firm(2) Why and when firms would engage in horizontal combination and/or in vertical integrationb. Transaction costs(1) Firm faces a variety of costs whether it makes something internally or instead relies on an outside supplier or distributor(2) Relative transactions costs within and outside the firm determines the decision on firm size and mergers(3) Managers should weigh transactions costs of separate versus merged entities before proceeding with merger transaction1.3 规模经济直径增长低于面积增长：Technical and engineering relations such as between volume and surface area存货管理中的大数定律：存货越多，管理成本占收入比例越低信息和物流技术的进步降低了存货成本Specialization：Firms of larger size may be able to organize production into specialist groups that emphasize a single taskThe distribution of fixed costs over a larger number of units1.4 范围经济Enable firm to produce related additional products at lower cost because of experience with existing productsFor example, in pharmaceutical industry, adding new drugs to a particular therapeutic class benefits from both production experience and marketing utilization1.5 营销、研发和管理提高管理水平：收购方相信本公司的管理水平能够提升目标公司的资源的使用效率，常见于大公司兼并小公司维持研发能力：通过合并研发预算来适应技术性的竞争，多发生于制药行业扩张分销网络，与可靠的分销渠道建立紧密的联系，使得产品能够以经济的方式到达消费者手中2、opportunistic incentives现金流处置权：追求规模增长和创造股东财富可能冲突追求短期市场回报纳税筹划追求市场价格决定力3 三种类型并购的解释3.1 横向并购市场支配和垄断制定和维持高于市场竞争水平的价格的能力，可以用“勒纳指数= (价格-边际成本)/价格”来衡量产品差别、进入壁垒和市场份额和市场支配能力正相关研究结果表明，并购报告对行业竞争者并不具有显著的影响，即使有也小于被兼并的公司。此外，反垄断诉讼对行业竞争者也没有影响，这些研究未能支持市场支配能力假说垄断、重新定价和社会福利 垄断影响产品定价能力：在完全竞争市场，厂商根据D和MC来确定产量和价格，消费者剩余= PE1Q1O – P1E1Q1O = PP1E1，生产者剩余= P1E1Q1O-M1E1Q1O=M1SE1P1然而在垄断下，厂商根据边际收入和边际成本来确定产量和价格，新消费者剩余PP2E2，新生产者剩余M1SE2P2，净损失E2SE1由于边际收入曲线低于需求曲线，所以价格提高，产量降低，减少社会福利。价格PMC社会福利损失E2P2E1P1SM1DOQ2Q1产量MR3.2 纵向并购：技术联合和专用性 技术联合汽车制