财务会计理论（第6版）威廉·R·斯科特-scott_6e_PPT_ch10a.pptVIP

Copyright ? 2012 Pearson Canada Inc 10 - * Financial Accounting TheorySixth EditionWilliam R. ScottChapter 10 Executive Compensation 10 - * Chapter 10Executive Compensation 10 - * 10.2 Are Incentive Contracts Necessary? No: Fama (1980) Forces of reputation on managerial labour market enough to motivate manager to work hard Assumes managerial labour market works well Yes: Wolfson (1985) Forces of reputation help to motivate manager, but incentive contract still needed Suggests that managerial labour markets do not work fully well See Supp. slides for details 10 - * 10.3 The RBC Compensation Plan Components of senior management compensation Salary Short-term incentive bonus Cash bonus or deferred share units Mid-term incentive plan Paid in deferred share units Long-term incentive plan Paid in ESOs Continued 10 - * Proposed changes to compensation plan 2009 Deferral of bonus payments Claw back bonus if fraud or misconduct Greater weight on individual non-financial performance measures Increased required executive stock holdings Effects on manager decision horizon? Effects on manager risk? The RBC Compensation Plan (continued) 10 - * 10.4 The Theory of Executive Compensation Desirable properties of a performance measure Sensitivity Precision Generally, these properties have to be traded off Share price High in sensitivity, low in precision Net income Low in sensitivity, high in precision Continued 10 - * The Theory of Executive Compensation (continued) How to increase sensitivity of net income Reduce recognition lag Net income “waits” until many aspects of manager effort are realized RD, advertising, legal environmental liabilities Capital expenditure programs Current value accounting reduces recognition lag But decreases precision Continued 10 - * The Theory of Executive Compensation (continued) How to increase sensitivity of net income (continued) Full disclosure More difficult for manager to disguise shirking by earnings management Enables