博弈论课后作业lecture5.docxVIP

? ? A product subset X = ×j∈N Xj ? A is rationalizable if there exists a collection ( j j )j∈N ) ( (aj ) ∈ ?(Xt+1 G??? T?????: L?????? ? Instructor: Xiang Sun* Updated: 21:32, September 17, 2013 In equilibrium each players choice is optimal given his correct belief about opponents actions. However, it is not clear how each player can know the other players equilibrium actions. Nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality, nor a reasonable empirical proposition. ---Berheim (Econometrica, 1984, p. 1007) For this reason, game theorists have developped solution concepts that do not entail this assumption. Westudysomesolutionconcepts,inwhichtheplayersbeliefsabouteachothersactionsarenotassumedtobecorrect, but are constrained by considerations of rationality: each player believes that the actions taken by every other player is a best response to some belief, and, further, each player assumes that every other player reasons in this way and hence thinks that every other player believes that every other players action is a best response to some belief, and so on. 1 Rationalizability 1. e basic idea behind the notion of rationalizability is that rational behavior must be justified by rational beliefs and conversely, rational beliefs must be based on rational behavior. 2. e idea can be illustrated explicitly by a two-person game as follows: ? A strategy of i is called 1-justifiable if it is a best response to some beliefs of i about the strategic choice of j. ? A strategy of i is called t-justifiable (where t ≥ 2) if it is a best response to a belief of i that assigns positive probabilities only to (t ? 1)-justifiable strategies of j. ? A strategy of i is rationalizable if it is a best response to a belief of i that assigns positive probabilities only to t-justifiable strategies of j for all t ≥ 1. 3. e notion aims to be weak; it determines not what actions should actually be taken, but what actions can be ruled out with confidence. 4. For simplicity, we