博弈论课后作业lecture2.docxVIP

? ? for each player i ∈ N a preference relation ? on on A = × G??? T?????: L?????? ? Instructor: Xiang Sun* Updated: 22:35, September 9, 2013 1 Strategicgames 1. Astrategicgameisamodelofinteractivedecision-makinginwhicheachdecision-makerchooseshisplanofaction once and for all, and these choices are made simultaneously. 2. A strategic game, denoted by ?N, (Ai), (?i)?, consists of ? a finite set N of players ? for each player i ∈ N a nonempty set Ai of strategies i j∈N Aj . 3. If the set Ai of every player i is finite, then the game is finite. 4. A strategy for a player is a complete plan of actions. It specifies a feasible action for the player in every contingency in which the player might be called on to act. 5. In a simulatneous-move game, the set of strategies is the same as the set of feasible actions. 6. In a dynamic game, the set of strategies may be different from the set of feasible actions Figure 1: Strategies and actions In this game, player 2 has 2 actions, L′ and R′, but 4 strategies, L′L′, L′R′, R′L′ and R′R′. 7. e model places no restrictions on the set of strategies available to a player, which may be a huge set containing complicated plans that cover a variety of contingencies. e preference relation or utility function may not be continuous. 8. We oen assume that ?i can be represented by a payoff function ui : A → R. In such a case we denote the game by ?N, (Ai), (ui)?. *E-mail: xiangsun.econ@. Suggestion and comments are always welcome. 1 a a ∈ A induces a lottery g(a, ·) on outcomes. In this case, a preference relation ? 2 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 Game eory 2/9 Lecture 2 9. We may model a game in which the consequence of a profile is affected by an exogenous random variable; a profile i over A can defined as: a ?i b if and only if g(b, ·) is at least as good as g(a, ·), e.g., E[ui(g(a, ·))] ≥ E[ui(g(b, ·))]. 10. A finite strategic game in which there are two players can be described conveniently in a table. 11. When referring to the strategies/a