博弈论课后作业lecture3.docxVIP

(1) (1) Since a? is a Nash equilibrium, ui(a?) ≥ ui(ai,a? j ) for all ai ∈ Ai. en ui(a?) ≥ min a ai ∈ Ai. Hence we have ui(a?) ≥ maxminui(ai,aj ). G??? T?????: L?????? ? Instructor: Xiang Sun* Updated: 20:17, September 16, 2013 1 Strictlycompetitivegames 1. For an arbitrary strategic game, we can say little about the set of Nash equilibria. However, for strictly competitive games, we can say something about the qualitative character of the equilibria. 2. A two-person game ?{1, 2}, (Ai), (?i)? is strictly competitive if for any a ∈ A and b ∈ A we have a ?1 b if and only if b ?2 a. 3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that a strictly competitive game can be represented as a two-person zero-sum game ?{1, 2}, (Ai), (ui)? in which payoff functions satisfy u1 + u2 = 0. 4. a?i ∈ Ai is a maxminimizer for player i if min aj ∈Aj ui(a?i ,aj ) ≥ min ∈Aj ui(ai,aj ) for all ai ∈ Ai. Player i maxminimizes if he chooses an action that is best for him on the assumption that whatever he does, player j will choose her action to hurt him as much as possible. 5. Lemma: max min uj (ai,aj ) = ? min max ui(ai,aj ). aj ∈Aj ai∈Ai ∈Aj ai∈Ai Proof: max min uj (ai,aj ) = ? min max ?uj (ai,aj ) = ? min aj ∈Aj ai∈Ai ∈Aj ai∈Ai ∈Aj max ai∈Ai ui(ai,aj ). 6. Proposition: a? is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for i = 1, 2, a? is is maxminimizer and max ai∈Ai min aj ∈Aj ui(ai,aj ) = ui(a?) = min aj ∈Aj max ai∈Ai ui(ai,aj ). 7. Interpretation: a profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the action of each player is maxminimizer. is result provides a link between individual decision-making and the reasoning behind the notion of Nash equilibrium. 8. Proof: ?: aj aj ui(ai,aj ) for all *E-mail: xiangsun.econ@. Suggestion and comments are always welcome. 1 ? ? [ [a ? q? [ [a ? q? min min i ,aj ). Hence ui(a?) ≤ maxminui(ai,aj ). u ui(a?) = ?uj (a?) = ? max ? ? ? ?cLq2, with probability 1 ? θ, Game eory 2/9 Lecture 3 (2) Since ui + uj = 0, ui(a?) = ?uj (a?) ≤ ?uj (ai ?,aj