供应链信息共享机制与博弈均衡分析.pdfVIP

较大修改之处：

1.第３页最后一段用下段替代：

Theorganizationoftherestthisbookisasfollows.Inchapter2,wereviewrelatedliterature,

positionthisthesisandexplicitlystatethequestionsaddressedinthisresearch.Inchapter3,we

presentthestructureofourmodelwithonerandtwobuyerswithuncertaindownstream

demand.Inchapter4,weprovideaBayesianNashequilibriumsolutionofthisgame.Then,in

chapter5,weanalyzethesymmetricgameinwhichbothyersagreetosharethesame

amountofinformation.Inchapter6,weextendthemodelanalysisbyconsideringdifferent

informationstructuresandmoreyersinthegame.Inchapter7,westudyhorizontal

informationsharinginaduopolywithcapacityconstraints.Weshowhowcapacityconstraints

affectfirms’incentivestoshareinformation.Finally,wesummarizeallthecontributionsand

proposedirectionsforfurtherresearchinchapter8.

2.第15页，图下的图标为：

Figure3.1Timelineofevents

3.第19页，倒数第二行：

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4.第84页第二段用下段替代：

Alongthesupplychainliterature,researchisfocusedonthevalueofverticalinformation

sharinganditseffectonbullwhipeffect(LeeandWhang2000).CachonandFisher(2000)

studythevalueofsharingdemandandinventoryinformationinatwo-levelsupplychainwith

oner,Nidenticalretailers,andstationarystochasticcustomerdemand.Theyfindthat

thevalueofreducingleadtimesandincreasingdeliveryfrequencyismoresignificantthan

informationsharingalone.Li(2002)considersthesupplychainwithonemanufacturerand

multiplecompetingretailers.Theystudytheincentivesforretailerstosharetheirprivate

information