外文翻译--审计质量、审计代理问题与财务信息质量的关系.docVIP

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 外文题目 Audit quality and the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality 外文出处 Department of Accounting and Finance University of Vaasa 外文作者 Johanna Miettinen 原文： Audit quality and the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality Abstract This study examines the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. It contributes to the existing literature by considering agency theory and audit research concerned with audit quality. The following hypotheses are tested based on the underlying literature: 1) Auditee’s agency problems are positively associated with audit quality, 2) Audit quality is positively associated with financial information quality, and 3) Audit quality mediates the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. To provide insight on the above hypotheses a path analysis is employed for a sample of 932 SP 1500 firms. Auditee’s agency problems are measured by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow. Moreover, audit quality is measured by audit fees and non-audit services fees (i.e. total fees) paid to the incumbent auditor. Finally, financial information quality is measured by absolute discretionary accruals. The results reveal that auditee’s agency problems are positively associated with audit quality. In addition, it is found that audit quality increases financial information quality. Finally, it is documented that audit quality is a potential mediator in the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. These findings imply that auditees’ agency problems explain the demand for a high quality auditor. Furthermore, these results suggest that high audit quality successfully fulfils its role as a monitoring mechanism