会计欺诈外文翻译.doc

外文翻译 原文 Accounting Fraud MaterialSource:32/scholar?q=cache:RuFjeCl9gG4J:/+Capital+markets+++the+account Author: Robert H. Davidson In this paper, I examine whether macroeconomic conditions influence the propensity to commit accounting fraud. I find that the incidence of observed accounting fraud is increasing in GDPand is at its highest in the periods leading up to an economic peak. In addition, the incidence of observed accounting fraud is decreasing in the average correlation between firm and market returns and the average magnitude of analyst forecast errors; the relation is increasing in average price-earnings ratios. When examining the relation betwee macroeconomic conditionsand firm-level fraud determinants I find that the association between CEO compensation incentives and the propensity to observe accounting fraud is generally negative, but is positive and significant during periods of high price sensitivity to earnings news. Analyzing accounting fraud by type reveals that revenue fraud is increasing in the price sensitivity to revenue news;this relation does not exist for expense or balance sheet fraud. Additionally, balance sheet fraud is increasing in the default risk premium. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that market-wide incentives for managers to manipulate earnings influence the decision to commit accounting fraud above and beyond firm-level determinants. Over the last 100 years, recessions have been routinely accompanied brevelations of scandalous reporting failures at many firms. Fraudulent reporting was exposed after the Great Crash in 1929, after the Savings Loans scandal in the 1980s, and after the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s/early 2000s1. Sweeping changes in regulation have often followed these scandals; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, was drafted to reduce the likelihood of fraudulent reporting after the dot-com crash. Additionally, Baker and Wurgler [2007] note the dramatic decrease in stock prices that occur