公司治理与行政长官赔偿的相关性外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance1 Material Source: EBSCO Author: John, Robert. Holthausen, David. Larcker 6.1. Mix of pay as an economic determinant of compensation The mix of pay is included as an economic determinant to provide insight into whether controlling for compensation risk in regressions of the level of pay significantly affects our results. If firms provide more incentives to the CEO through pay risk when monitoring is more difficult, and if our board-of-director and ownership variables proxy for low monitoring quality, it is conceivable that the increase in pay level associated with these variables results from an increase in compensation risk. However, this would not explain why the predicted excess compensation arising from board and ownership structure variables is negatively correlated with subsequent performance. Never the less, in order to see how sensitive our results are to this issue, we include the mix of pay (defined as the difference between total compensation and salary, divided by total compensation) as an economic determinant of pay. The second column of Table 5 contains the regression coefficient estimates on the board and ownership structure variables when mix of pay is included in the compensation regression. The results indicate that most of the board and ownership structure variables continue to remain significant; however, the chair/CEO variable, busy directors, CEO ownership and non-CEO insider ownership are no longer statistically significant. The results in the second column of Table 6 indicate that the predicted excess compensation arising from the board and ownership structure variables has a significant negative association with subsequent accounting performance and stock returns, even after controlling for compensation risk (mix of pay) as an economic determinant of compensation. By including mix of pay as an economic determinant, we are implicitly assuming that it is set