联系交易, 代理冲突与中小投资者保护.pdfVIP

关联交易、代理冲突与中小投资者保护 刘白兰 邹建华 （中山大学岭南学院，广东广州 510275） 摘要：本文全面分析了2002-2006年间我国上市公司关联交易总体状况,证明了非公允关联交 易与上市公司价值之间具有负相关关系。在此基础上，以非公允关联交易的规模作为中小投 资者受侵害程度的代理变量，分析了股权结构、“自我约束”机制以及法治环境对于中小投 资者保护的影响。实证结果表明,关联交易的发生规模与第一大股东持股比例正相关,与股权 制衡能力负相关，中小投资者因上市公司的“政治关系”而受损；境外交叉上市、聘请外部 董事的“自我约束”机制以及法治环境的改善、市场化进程的加快可以有效的约束控股股东 对于中小投资者的掠夺。 关键词：关联交易；代理冲突；股权结构；法制环境；中小投资者保护 作者简介：刘白兰，中山大学岭南学院博士生，研究方向：金融法规与政策。邹建华，中山 大学岭南学院教授，博士生导师。 中图分类号:F830.91 文献标识码:A Abstract：Based on analyzing related-party transactions of Chinese listed firms during the period of 2002-2006, this paper finds that the potentially harmful related-party transactions is negatively correlated with listed company s Tobin s Q. Using the value of a firm s potentially harmful related-party transactions as a proxy for the degree of expropriation, we analyzes the effects of ownership structure, bonding mechanism and law environment on minority investor protection. The empirical study finds that the scale of related-party transactions is positively correlated with the share proportion controlled by the largest shareholder and negatively correlated with counter-balance towards the largest shareholder. Minority investors suffer form listed companies political connections. The bonding practices including listing the companies in foreign stock exchanges, having outside directors and increasing proportion of fixed assets, as well as improving law environment and promoting commercialization process could restrain the controlling shareholders expropriation of minority investors. Key Words: Related-party Transaction; Agency Conflicts; Ownership Structure; Law Environment ; Minority Investor Protection 问题的提出 对于大多数国家的公司而言, 基本的代理问题不是Berle和Means所描述的股东与管理 者之间的冲突, 而是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突 （Shleifer and Vishny,1997; 郑志刚， [15] [20] [28] 2004 ；冯根福，2004） 。