会计学专业外文翻译--股权集中度在私营企业的职责.docVIP

外文原文： Ownership Concentration in Disclosure Standards,Auditor Choice,and Auditing Infrastructure ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries.Accounting transparency can help alleviatethe agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration,since the expropria- tion of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden.After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants,we find weak(no)evidence that extensive disclosure standards(auditor choice)reduce ownership concentration.In contrast,we report strong,robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors,consistent with Ball’s[2001]predictions.Collectively,our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards.Re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. 1.Introduction In this paper,we provide new evidence from 190 firms in 31 countries on the role of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics in reducing information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders. We mainly contribute to extant research by examining the importance of legal institutions that discipline auditors to ownership concentration.Ball [2001,p.128]argues that isolated reforms intended to improve financial reporting quality such as requiring a country’s firms to follow international accounting standards will be futile without concurrent changes to its securities laws that hold auditors