中国上市公司高管人员监管与激励探讨.pdf

摘 要 近年来，创维、伊利、科龙等上市公司由高管人员违规而引发的重大管理 腐败问题层出不穷。这表明上市公司监管与内部治理存在制度性缺陷和管理漏 洞。同时，从另一侧面也反应出上市公司内部激励体系尚不够健全。关于现行 公司高管人员监管和激励理论的优与劣，利与弊，以及改革的模式选择问题， 一直是理论界和学术界讨论的热点话题，也是管理实践中尚未完全破解的难 题。作为人力资源专业的研究生，选择上市公司高管人员的监管与激励这样的 问题进行研究对自己的知识和能力是一种挑战。本文旨在借鉴国内外先进的管 理经验结合实际的调查案例，从经济学的层面对高层管理人员的行为进行分 析，得出对高层管理人员的监管对策；同时借鉴已有的契约理论中包括经济契 约、心理契约、组织契约，意图找到对高层管理人员进行激励的对策。 关键词：监管 管理腐败 契约 Abstract In recent years， Kelon ， Yili ， Skyworth ， and other listed companies’ senior management personnel all were stunned by serious corruption .This shows that the internal governance of listed companies lie in a system for monitoring errors and management loopholes. At the same time， this reflected listed company’ internal incentive system is not sound. In the case of existing companies， senior management personnel’ supervision and incentive theories have superiority and inferiority. The management practice has not been completely solved these problems. As a human resources professional graduate student ， the choice that I choose senior management personnel’ supervision and motivation of listed companies for me is a challenge. This article aims to draw on the advanced management experiences and the actual investigation of some cases. From the level of the economics ， I want to analysis senior management’ conduct to get monitoring measurements; At the same time the existing contract from economic theory ， including leases ， psychological contracts and leases encourage senior management personnel. Key word: Supervision; corruption of management ; contract 1 导言 1.1 研究背景以及意义 上市公司是可以在证券市场进行公开股权交易的公众公司。对于中国这样 一个积极创新、锐意进取的国家来说，上市公司不仅是一个全新的组织形式和 筹资模式，同时它