·股权制衡:公平和效率抉择—基于中国上市公司实证研究.docVIP

·股权制衡:公平和效率抉择—基于中国上市公司实证研究.doc

  1. 1、原创力文档(book118)网站文档一经付费(服务费),不意味着购买了该文档的版权,仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用,不得用于商业用途,未经授权,严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等,侵权必究。。
  2. 2、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传,本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺!文档内容仅供研究参考,付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费,意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险,本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务;查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档,您可以点击 这里二次下载
  3. 3、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等,请点击“版权申诉”(推荐),也可以打举报电话:400-050-0827(电话支持时间:9:00-18:30)。
  4. 4、该文档为VIP文档,如果想要下载,成为VIP会员后,下载免费。
  5. 5、成为VIP后,下载本文档将扣除1次下载权益。下载后,不支持退款、换文档。如有疑问请联系我们
  6. 6、成为VIP后,您将拥有八大权益,权益包括:VIP文档下载权益、阅读免打扰、文档格式转换、高级专利检索、专属身份标志、高级客服、多端互通、版权登记。
  7. 7、VIP文档为合作方或网友上传,每下载1次, 网站将根据用户上传文档的质量评分、类型等,对文档贡献者给予高额补贴、流量扶持。如果你也想贡献VIP文档。上传文档
查看更多
股权制衡:公平与效率的抉择基于中国上市公司的实证研究 张光荣 曾勇 电子科技大学管理学院 610054 Check-and-balance Ownership Structure, A Trade-off Between Fairness and Efficiency: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies ZHANG Guang-rong, ZENG Yong School of Management of UESTC, P.R.China, 610054 摘要*在存在控制性大股东的公司中,控股股东可能利用其对公司的控制权侵占公司资源,损害小股东利益。其他大股东的进入有助于形成制衡的股权结构,减少控股股东的侵占行为,但其负面影响是股东之间的互相牵制影响决策效率。本文分析了股权制衡可能对公司带来有利和不利两方面影响使用我国上市公司2001-2004年数据分别考察了股权制衡的这两种效应。研究结果表明,股权制衡机制确实可以对大股东的侵占行为产生制约,减轻大股东对公司利益的侵占,但同时,股权制衡会对公司的经营绩效产生显著的负面影响,这种负面影响在国有控股的公司和业绩好的公司中更为明显。最优股权制衡程度的选择需要在股权制衡带来的提高公平和损失效率两种效应之间进行权衡。 关键词股权制衡公司治理大股东侵占经营绩效 Abstract: expropriate corporate resources and harm minority shareholders’ benefit by taking advantage of their control rights in companies with controlling shareholders. The entrance of other blockholders can form check-and-balance ownership structure, which can restrict controlling shareholders’ expropriation. But on the other hand, the entrance of other blockholders bring about negative influence on the efficiency of the company’s management decision because of restricting one another among major shareholders. This paper firstly analyzes the advantageous and disadvantageous effects of the check-and-balance ownership structure, and then empirically investigates these two kinds of effects based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2004. The empirical results show that, the check-and-balance ownership structure can restrict expropriation, thus protect the benefits of minority shareholders. However, the presence of outside blockholders can have the significant negative influences on company’s operating performance, especially in the state-owned companies and well-performed companies. Therefore, the optimal ownership structure may be a trade-off between these two effects of enhancing fairness and losing efficiency that are brought by outside blockholders. Key words: Check-and-balance ownership structure, Corporate governance, Expropriation, Operating performance 1 引言大股东与小股东之间的利益

文档评论(0)

bhyq + 关注
实名认证
文档贡献者

该用户很懒,什么也没介绍

1亿VIP精品文档

相关文档