董事会特征对自愿性信息披露影响及实证研究——基于信息技术行业上市公司及经验证据-毕业论文.docVIP

南京航空航天大学硕士学位论文  摘  要  信息是连接上市公司和证券市场的桥梁和纽带。信息的充分披露，可以降低证券市场发 行与交易过程中的信息不对称、节约交易成本；避免签约前投资者的逆向选择与抑制管理当 局签约后的道德风险与机会主义行为。信息的披露可以分为强制性披露信息和自愿性披露信 息。自愿性披露信息是强制性披露信息的深化与补充，它对于增强信息披露的透明度具有重 要作用。 本文以交易费用理论、代理理论、信号理论和有效市场假说论等作为理论支撑，借鉴国 内外相关文献的研究方法和结论，结合我国特有的研究背景，从董事会的规模、独立性、专 业背景、激励机制和行为能力等方面出发，研究董事会特征对自愿信息披露水平的影响，提 出本文的研究假设。在实证研究过程中，结合研究问题的具体情况，构建了回归模型，并挑 选了一些能有效描述董事会特征的变量，检验了上市公司董事会特征与自愿性信息披露水平 的关系。研究表明：独立董事比例与自愿性信息披露显著的正相关；领导结构的二元性── 董事长与总经理两职合一与自愿性信息披露则呈显著的负相关关系，但并没有发现董事会中 董事会规模、董事会会议次数、持股董事比例和财务背景董事比例对自愿信息披露水平有显 著影响。 最后，根据上述结论，本文提出了完善我国上市公司董事会结构，提升自愿性信息披露 水平的政策性建议。 关键词：自愿性信息披露，董事会特征，上市公司，回归分析，实证研究 i 董事会特征对自愿性信息披露影响的实证研究 Abstract Information is a link between listed companies and the capital market. Adequate information disclosure can reduce information asymmetry during issuing securities, save transaction costs, avoid “adverse selection” of investors before signing a contract and suppress “internal control” , “moral hazard” and opportunism of the company managements. Accounting information disclosure can be divided into mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure can be defined as disclosures in excess of requirements, representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual reports. It has played an important role in capital market by  enhancing  the transparency and adequacy of information disclosure.  Based on expenses theory, substitute theory, signal theory, valid market hypothesis, learning from the related research method and conclusion in foreign literature and making combination with our specific background, this article put forward the research hypothesis and directorate structure, how directors hold the stock and posts. In the demonstration part, we choose listed  companies  as the research objective, making the index of company voluntary information  disclosure and combining with the analysis of board characterist