股权分置改革论文：后股权分置时期大股东控制与公司资.docVIP

股权分置改革论文：后股权分置时期大股东控制与公司资本性投资 【中文摘要】目前学术界对公司治理存在的主要利益冲突的研究集中到了大股东与中小股东之间。而在我国上市公司中,特殊的转轨经济体制导致了我国“国有股一股独大”,这样一种特殊股权结构的存在,就导致了我国上市公司大股东与中小股东的利益冲突更为严重。很多情况下表现为大股东及内部人对上市公司的超强控制,而正是“国有股一股独大”的股权结构也使得公司治理机制严重弱化。而且在现阶段我国各项法律制度不尽完善,监管还不到位的情况下,大股东或其内部人能够左右着公司各项财务和经营决策,因而我国上市公司资本性投资行为特征也体现着侵占的烙印。大股东的超强控制抑制了公司内部治理机制的发挥,同时也严重阻碍了资本市场的健康发展,也扰乱了正常市场经济秩序。正因为如此,股权分置改是对我国不合理的股权结构进行一次改良。本文在系统的回顾国内外学者对公司投资行为研究文献的基础上,结合我国大股东控制这一股权特征,选取了现金流权比例、控制权比例、两权分离度和控制人性质四个变量,同时考虑到股权分置改革可能导致的股权结构的变化和公司治理机制的完善,对我国上市公司在大股东控制下资本性投资行为进行研究,同时考虑股权分置改革对大股东控制及其控制下公司投资行为所产生的影响。研究结果显示：我国存在着大股东一股独大的股权结构,在公司治理机制被弱化,制度监管又比较薄弱的情况下,我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资行为,并且投资具有自由现金流敏感,自由现金流越多,过度投资越严重；相比非国有上市公司而言,国有上市公司中发生的非效率投资更为严重；现金流权比例的提高有助于缓解公司的过度投资行为,股权分置改革能有效增加这种缓解作用；两权分离度的降低能抑制过度投资行为的发生,股改同样能增强这种抑制效应；但控制权比例的减少并没能达到与预期一致的效果；股权分置改革前企业过度投资严重,股权分置改革后过度投资变得不显著,说明股权分置改革对公司过度投资行为有了一定的矫正作用,缓解了公司过度投资行为的发生,提高了公司的投资效率。并且股权分置改革对国有控股公司过度投资的抑制作用明显高于对非国有控股公司的抑制作用。 【英文摘要】The main Research about the corporate governance is about the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and small shareholders, in China, special economic system led to China抯 character that “the dominance of state-owned shares”, this Special ownership structure led the conflicts between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders of listed companies More serious. In many cases the performance of large shareholders and insiders of the super control of listed companies, and it was “due to the dominance of state-owned shares” of the ownership structure also makes a serious weakening of corporate governance. And at this stage, the legal system and Regulators is not perfect in China. the insiders or major shareholders of the company can influence the financial and operating decisions, and therefore capital investment of listed companies also Reflected the aggressive behavior characteristics. Over control of major shareholders within the company to play a governance mechanism, but also seriously hindered the healthy development of capital markets, and disrupted