北大光华微观经济学作业答案09SolutionPS4.pdfVIP

Answers to Problem Set 4 Question 1. a) Jones 1 2 3 Smith 1 3,-3 -1,1 -1,1 2 -1,1 3,-3 -1,1 3 -1,1 -1,1 3,-3 b) There is no pure strategy equilibrium. For mixed strategy equilibrium, suppose Smith take (x,y,1-x-y), by equivalence principle, 3x – y – (1-x-y) = -x + 3y – (1-x-y) = -x –y + 3(1-x-y) Which means x = y = 1/3. So the mixed strategy equilibrium is ((1/3,1/3,1/3),(1/3,1/3,1/3)) c) The expected payoff for Smith: 1/3 * 3 + 1/3 * (-1) + 1/3 * (-1) = 1/3. The expected payoff for Jones: 1/3 * (-3) + 1/3 * 1 + 1/3 * 1 = -1/3 Question 2. a) There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibrium: (N, P) and (P, N). For mixed strategy equilibrium, suppose (x,1-x) is taken by A. By equivalence principle, we have x = 3/4. So the mixed strategy equilibrium is ((3/4,1/4), (3/4,1/4)). b) Suppose A moves first, the game tree is as follows. P (3,3) The perfect Nash Equilibrium here is (P,N), with B payoff (5,4). P N (5,4) So both players have first-move advantage. A P (4,5) N B N (2,2) c) There is some ambiguous in this problem. DONT count! If B can commit on his behavior ex-ante, i.e., he can commit that he will produce and A believe his commitment, then he does not need to pay A to stay out of the market. If B cannot commit, then they will mix ex-ante, with expected payoff 1/2 * 3 +