政府干预、GDP增长与地方国企过度投资 lowast;.pdfVIP

政府干预、GDP增长与地方国企过度投资∗ Government Influence, GDP Growth and Local SOE Overinvestment 唐雪松1 周晓苏2 马如静3 1.西南财经大学会计学院，成都 610074 2.南开大学商学院会计学系，天津 300071 3.南开大学经济学院国际经济研究所，天津 300071 摘要：本文研究政府干预是否导致地方国有企业过度投资？以上市公司（2000-2006 ）数据为样 本研究表明，在中国特殊的制度背景下，地方国企在政府干预下出现过度投资。市场化进程越 慢的地区，政府干预越严重，该地国有企业过度投资问题也越严重。特别地，当该地GDP增长 的相对业绩表现较差时，地方政府会加大对地方国企的干预，从而导致其过度投资问题更加严 重。而且，政府对地方国企的干预程度并未因政府持股方式变化而改变，政府间接持股的地方 国企与直接持股的地方国企同样地受到政府干预而发生过度投资。本文的研究结果从政府干预 角度拓展了已有关于企业过度投资成因的研究；为政府“掠夺之手”理论提供了转型经济环境中 企业投资领域的证据，也为近年来中国的政府官员政绩考核模式转变提供了理论与证据支持。 关键字：过度投资 政府干预 GDP增长 国有企业 政绩考核 Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of government influences on local SOE overinvestment. Using the data of listed firms in 2000 to 2006, we find that government influences bring about local SOE overinvestment in Chinese specific institutional background. In the regions with slower marketization pace, the government influences are stronger, and the problems of local SOE overinvestment are likely to be more severe. Particularly, when the relative performance of GDP growth is poor, local government will strengthen its influence on SOE, the problems of overinvestment are aggravated. What’s more, government influence does not change with the change of SOE shareholding style. The SOEs indirectly controlled by government have the same level of overinvestment as those SOEs directly controlled by government. The results extend existing researches on causes of overinvestment, bring forth evidences of investment about Grabbing Hand in transition economy, and support the reform of Chinese officer performance appraisement mode. Keywords: Overinvestment, Government Influence, GDP Growth, SOE, Officer Performance Appraisement 作者简介及联系方式： 唐雪松：西南财经大学会计学院，讲师，会计学博士。研究方向为公司治理、资本市场财务与 会计问题。通