使用NYOP营销渠道的优劣势分析[博士.pptVIP

When Should a Service Provider Utilize a ‘Name Your Own Price’ Channel? Tuo Wang Esther Gal-Or Rabikar Chatterjee Over $6 billion in total revenues from April ’98 to present. “Opaque” products Single-bid Operates on commission plus difference between bid and price set by service provider Research Questions From the service provider’s perspective: When does service provider benefit from selling through the NYOP channel? What are the optimal prices for the “posted-price” and the NYOP channels, and how much opacity should be introduced in the NYOP channel? How much information about consumer demand does the service provider need to have before he contracts with the NYOP retailer? Real World Set-up Our Model Set-up Model Assumptions Large population of potential rational consumers with reservation price vi ~ [0, 1] Degree of “opacity” in NYOP channel (1-d), 0 ? d ? 1 Discounted valuation in NYOP channel = d vi A single provider having capacity K≤1. Two-stage game Provider chooses the posted price PH and the opacity parameter d in the first stage. Provider chooses threshold for minimum acceptable bid PL in the second stage. Posted-price channel available to consumers in both stages NYOP channel only available in second stage Model Assumptions (Cont’d) Only a fraction of consumers at any valuation is actually active in the market. yv- denotes density of active consumers having valuation v. yv~ U[0,2] Eyv=1. y is a signal of demand density y~ U[0,2]. Two Possible Formulations: Formulation 1 Densities in the posted price and NYOP segments perfectly correlated, and y is a perfect signal of yv for all valuation levels. Model Assumptions (Cont’d) Rational Expectations-consumers know the distribution function of y. Provider guarantees that the service will be available to any consumer who is active in the posted price market. If the demand in the posted price exceeds capacity such a guarantee implies that the provider can use a sub-contractor to satisfy th