双重委托代理、股东优势激励契约设计.pdfVIP

双重委托代理、股东优势与激励契约设计 ——来自食品类上市公司的研究 任曙明, 王洪静, 叶梦1 (大连理工大学经济学院， 辽宁 大连 116023) 摘要：基于食品企业公司治理的双重任务、双重委托代理与股东优势三个特征，构建双 重委托代理模型理论分析了食品企业的最优激励契约均衡条件，并着重探讨了次优激励契约 的设计问题，而后以食品、饮料行业面板数据进行了实证检验。研究表明，食品企业普遍建 立了与公司经营业绩相联系的薪酬激励机制，但政府并没有建立起与食品安全控制相联系的 激励约束机制，这容易导致经营者过度关注公司经营业绩，忽略食品安全控制。同时，股东 优势会降低股东激励系数变化幅度，增大政府监管机构激励系数变化幅度。研究还发现，加 强董事长与总经理兼任、提高监事会持股数量，有利于激励经营者在食品安全控制中做出更 多努力。 关键词：激励契约设计；股东优势；双重委托代理；财务绩效；食品质量安全 [中图分类号] F830.33 [文献标识码] A [文章编号] Double Principal-Agent, Shareholder Superiority and Incentive Contract Design for Operators in Food Listed Companies Ren Shu-ming, Wang Hong-jing (School of Economics ，Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China) Abstract : Based on three features of corporate governance in food listed companies, double task, double principal-agent and shareholder superiority, we build up a double principal -agent model and analyze theoretically optimal incentive contract equilibrium conditions of food listed companies , and explores the second-best incentive contract design problem, and then has an empirical test with the food and beverage industry panel data. The results show that food listed companies generally have established pay incentives mechanisms linked with the companys operating performance, but the government has not established the incentive and restraint mechanisms associated with food safety control, which may induces operator to put excessive focus on the operating results and ignore food safety control. At the same time, shareholder superiority can reduce magnitude of changes of shareholder incentive coefficient and increase magnitude of changes of government regulators incentive