地研究领域中国经济改革微观激励机制改善和竞争性外部市场.docVIP

研究领域：中国经济改革* 复旦大学01级经济学基地班 内容摘要：本文尝试在一个进化博弈的框架下，解释国有企业改革的已有路径。中国的政府与国有企业之间本质上是一种缺乏有效监督的委托－代理关系。一个进化博弈模型解释了伴随着一系列的改革，当反映制度的变量“渐进”地发生变化时，博弈双方各自进化稳定策略（ESS）的变化趋势：改革之初的制度环境必然带来代理人（国企经理）的偷懒；随后，国企亏损日益加剧，促使委托人（政府）开始尝试放弃“委托”并对国有企业进行综合改革；随着微观激励机制的改善与竞争性外部市场的建设，代理人会选择更加努力地工作、国企效益逐步提高，而“委托”也会逐渐变得可监督且有效。希望能为诠释国企改革的进程提供一种思路。 关键词：委托－代理关系 微观激励机制 竞争性外部市场 进化博弈 Improvement of Incentives and a More Competitive Market NingHua Zhong (School of Economics, Fudan University) July 2004 Abstract: In this article, the author tries to explain the past process of China’s SOEs’ reform using evolutionary game theory. The relation between the governments of China and SOEs is, in essence, principals and agents in which principals can’t practice an efficient supervision. A evolutionary game theory model shows that along with the implementations of series of reform measures, variables which reflected institutions environment ‘gradually’ changed and then, both ‘principals’ and ‘agents’ ‘gradually’ changed their Evolutionary Stable Strategy: under the institution at the beginning of the reform, managers in SOEs were certain to be lazy; because of the following poor performance and huge deficits of SOEs, governments began to desert commission; and with the improvement of incentive institutions and a more competitive market, more managers made greater effort in working and thus SOEs’ performance improved. By this paper, the author hopes to present a new perspective in explaining the past SOEs’ reform. Key Words: principal-agent, incentive, competitive market, evolutionary game theory 作者联系方式： E-mail : 0115009@， zhongninghua@ 手机: 微观激励机制的改善与竞争性外部市场的建设 ——国有企业改革进程的进化博弈解释 钟宁桦 复旦大学01级经济学基地班 内容摘要：本文尝试在一个进化博弈的框架下，解释国有企业改革的已有路径。中国的政府与国有企业之间本质上是一种缺乏有效监督的委托－代理关系。一个进化博弈模型解释了伴随着一系列的改革，当反映制度的变量“渐进”地发生变化时，博弈双方各自进化稳定策略（ESS）的变化趋势：改革之初的制度环境必然带来代理人（国企经理）的偷懒；随后，国企亏损日益加剧，促使委托人（政府）开始尝试放弃“委托”并对国有企业进行综合改革；随着微观激励机制的改善与竞争性外部市场的建设，代理人会选择更加努力地工作、国企效益逐步提高，而“委托”也会逐渐变得可监督且有效。希望能为诠释国企改革的进程提供一种思路。 关键词：委托－代理关系 微观激励机制