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A system dynamics model for a mixed-strategy game between police and driver a b Dong-Hwan Kim * and Doa Hoon Kim Dong-Hwan Kim Abstract received a Ph.D. in public administration Game theorists have recommended many reasonable strategies in policy problems, using, in and policy analysis at general, the concept of equilibrium strategy for analyzing the dynamic consequences of Korea University in available policy options. One of the best known recommendations is that of George Tsebelis, Seoul, Korea 1991. which contends that increasing penalties is not a viable policy tool for decreasing the law- Currently, he works violation tendencies of drivers. This is because the interactions between police and driver on analyzing info- can best be represented as a mixed strategy in which the players choose their alternative telecommunication actions based upon a probability, but the probability of driver’s law violation cannot be policy as a senior decreased by increasing the penalty. Our system dynamics model for a mixed-strategy game researcher at ETRI shows that it takes a very long time for a game-theoretic equilibrium to appear. Therefore, (Electronics game players cannot, and should not, depend on the equilibrium for choosing their actions. Telecommunications Furthermore, our mixed-game model shows that an increase in penalty can induce Research Institute). compliance from the people, contradictory to the game-theoretic solution, but consistent His main interests with real-world behaviors. © 1997 by John Wiley Sons, Ltd. Syst. Dyn