altruism and turnout - james stronghstrong. fowler.pdfVIP

Altruism and Turnout James H. Fowler University of California, Davis Scholars have recently reworked the traditional calculus of voting model by adding a term for benefits to others. Although the probability that a single vote affects the outcome of an election is quite small, the number of people who enjoy the benefit when the preferred alternative wins is large. As a result, people who care about benefits to others and who think one of the alternatives makes others better off are more likely to vote. I test the altruism theory of voting in the laboratory by using allocations in a dictator game to reveal the degree to which each subject is con- cerned about the well-being of others. The main findings suggest that variation in concern for the well-being of others in conjunction with strength of party identification is a significant factor in individual turnout decisions in real world elections. Partisan altruists are much more likely to vote than their nonpartisan or egoist peers. or decades, social scientists have sought to I test the altruism theory of voting in the labora- explain why people vote (Campbell et al. 1960; tory by using a technique from experimental eco- Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schloz- nomics. Subjects are asked a number of standard F man, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone questions regarding their socioeconomic status, po- 1980). Rational choice scholars have typically litical beliefs, and turnout behavior in a California approached the problem by using models based on primary election. They then participate in a “dictator pure self-interest (Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957; Fedder- game” (Forsythe et al. 1