Psychological strongUnderstandingstrong and Social Skills - Martin Davies.pdfVIP

In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003. Psychological Understanding and Social Skills MARTIN DAVIES AND TONY STONE Suppose we use the term ‘theory of mind’ in a neutral and inclusive way, so that having a theory of mind is simply having an ability to engage in our everyday folk psychological practices of attribution, interpretation, and prediction. This use of the term is non- committal as to how the ability is to be explained. Perhaps the explanation is to be given in terms of possession of a substantive theory about how the psychological world works; perhaps in terms of a capacity to identify with others in imagination and to simulate their mental lives; or perhaps in terms of a mixture of these things. The neutral and inclusive use of ‘theory of mind’ is also non-committal as to whether the basis of our folk psychological abilities resides in a special-purpose module of the mind. Once we abstract away from questions about theory versus simulation and from questions about modularity, it can seem truistic that having a theory of mind – being able to engage in our everyday folk psychological practices or having psychological understanding – is fundamental to social functioning. Thus, for example, at the beginning of The Child’s Theory of Mind , Henry Wellman says (1990, p. 1): ‘Arriving at some sort of understanding of mind is an important accomplishment of childhood . . . An understanding of the mind is . . . fundamental to an understanding of the social world.’ Indeed, it seems natural to suppose that, just as a naïve or everyday understanding of physics enables us to negotiate the physical world, so also a naïve or everyday un