Income strongFluctuationstrong and Asymmetric Information An Example of a.pdfVIP

下载本文档

0
0
约8.57万字
约 24页
2016-03-09 发布于山东
举报
版权申诉

Income strongFluctuationstrong and Asymmetric Information An Example of a.pdf

1、本文档共24页，可阅读全部内容。
2、原创力文档（book118）网站文档一经付费（服务费），不意味着购买了该文档的版权，仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用，不得用于商业用途，未经授权，严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等，侵权必究。
3、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传，本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺！文档内容仅供研究参考，付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费，意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险，本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务；查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档，您可以点击这里二次下载。
4、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等，请点击“版权申诉”（推荐），也可以打举报电话：400-050-0827(电话支持时间：9:00-18:30)。
5、该文档为VIP文档，如果想要下载，成为VIP会员后，下载免费。
6、成为VIP后，下载本文档将扣除1次下载权益。下载后，不支持退款、换文档。如有疑问请联系我们。
7、成为VIP后，您将拥有八大权益，权益包括：VIP文档下载权益、阅读免打扰、文档格式转换、高级专利检索、专属身份标志、高级客服、多端互通、版权登记。
8、VIP文档为合作方或网友上传，每下载1次，网站将根据用户上传文档的质量评分、类型等，对文档贡献者给予高额补贴、流量扶持。如果你也想贡献VIP文档。上传文档

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 51, 367-390 (1990) Income Fluctuation and Asymmetric Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem* JONATHAN THOMAS Department of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry, CV4 7AL U.K., and Faculty of Economics, University of Konstanz. D-7750 Konstanz 1, West Germany AND TIM WORRALL Faculty of Economics, University of Konstanz, D-7750 Konsianz 1, West Germany Received September 24, 1986; revised October 13, 1989 We examine a simple repeated principal-agent model with discounting. There are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender. The efficient contract is characterized. It tends to the first-best (constant consumption) contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity. If the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enfor- ceable the borrower’s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one. If the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference. Journal of Economi