第十六章资本结构债务的运用.pptVIP

Chapter Outline 16.1 Costs of Financial Distress 16.2 Description of Costs 16.3 Can Costs of Debt Be Reduced? 16.4 Integration of Tax Effects and Financial Distress Costs 16.5 Shirking, Perquisites, and Bad Investments: A Note on Agency Cost of Equity 16.6 The Pecking-Order Theory 16.7 Growth and the Debt-Equity Ratio 16.8 Personal Taxes 16.9 How Firms Establish Capital Structure 16.10 Summary and Conclusions 16.1 Costs of Financial Distress Bankruptcy risk versus bankruptcy cost. The possibility of bankruptcy has a negative effect on the value of the firm. However, it is not the risk of bankruptcy itself that lowers value. Rather it is the costs associated with bankruptcy. It is the stockholders who bear these costs. 16.2 Description of Costs Direct Costs Legal and administrative costs (tend to be a small percentage of firm value). Indirect Costs Impaired ability to conduct business (e.g., lost sales) Agency Costs Selfish strategy 1: Incentive to take large risks Selfish strategy 2: Incentive toward underinvestment Selfish Strategy 3: Milking the property Balance Sheet for a Company in Distress Assets BV MV Liabilities BV MV Cash $200 $200 LT bonds $300 Fixed Asset $400 $0 Equity $300 Total $600 $200 Total $600 $200 What happens if the firm is liquidated today? Selfish Strategy 1: Take Large Risks The Gamble Probability Payoff Win Big 10% $1,000 Lose Big 90% $0 Cost of investment is $200 (all the firm’s cash) Required return is 50% Expected CF from the Gamble = $1000 × 0.10 + $0 = $100 Selfish Stockholders Accept Negative NPV Project with Large Risks Expected CF from the Gamble To Bondholders = $300 × 0.10 + $0 = $30 To Stockholders = ($1000 - $300) × 0.10 + $0 = $70 PV of Bonds Without the Gamble = $200 PV of Stocks Without the Gamble = $0 PV of Bonds With the Gamble = $30 / 1.5 = $20 PV of Stocks With the Gamble = $70 / 1.5 = $47 Selfish Strategy 2: Underinvestment Consider a government-sponsored project that guarantees $350 in one period Cost of