game theory4 博弈论 英文.pptxVIP

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game theory4 博弈论 英文

Introduction to Game Theory Lecture 4 Review Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium review example best response functions – graphs Game Elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by mixed strategies illustration example 2 Preview / 32 Review MSNE Elimination By Mixing Summary Strict vs. weak dominance Elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to: strict Nash equilibria but can eliminate nonstrict Nash equilibria That is why we only eliminate strictly dominated strategies 3 Review Review MSNE Elimination By Mixing Summary / 32 Mixed strategy NE need for making oneself unpredictable leads to mixing strategies Mixed strategy: player chooses a probability distribution (p1,p2,..,pN) over her set of actions rather than a single action If there is no NE without mixing, we will find at least one MSNE (Nash - proof) If NE without mixing exists, we may find additional MSNE 4 Review Review MSNE Elimination By Mixing Summary / 32 Review Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium review example best response functions – graphs Game Elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by mixed strategies illustration example 5 Preview Review MSNE Elimination By Mixing Summary / 32 two NE: (B,B) and (S,S) any MSNE? P1 must be indifferent between B and S (otherwise not mixing, playing pure strategy): q*2+(1-q)*0 = q*0+(1-q)*1 = q=1/3 B S P2 must be indifferent between B and S: p*1+(1-p)*0 = p*0+(1-p)*2 = p=2/3 6 Mixed Strategy NE 2 1 B (q) S (1-q) B (p) 2,1 0,0 S (1-p) 0,0 1,2 Review MSNE Elimination By Mixing Summary / 32 If q1/3: S is better tha

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