Communication,RenegotiationandtheScopeforCollusion.pptVIP

Communication, Renegotiation and the Scope for Collusion David Cooper Florida State University Kai-Uwe Kühn University of Michigan The Standard Collusion Model Unresolved Problems in Collusion Theory Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion Explicit Collusion: How much does communication matter? Does collusion require specifying contingent strategies? Are feelings of spite or other “fairness” a sufficient enforcement mechanism for collusion? Renegotiation: Does it severely limit collusion as theory suggests? Communication to coordinate Simple coordination games In Collusion Models: Coordination on contingent strategies necessary Much greater complexity: Not coordination on simple actions, but on contingent rules necessary for the theory to be relevant The Two Stage Collusion Game The Two Stage Collusion Game The Two Stage Collusion Game What is Important in Chat? * * Results: First Period Choices with Chat Results: Second Period Choices with Chat Content Analysis All messages were coded for content. David and I separately developed coding schemes for a test sample of messages. We then reconciled our separate coding schemes into a single unified set of codes. Two RAs were independently trained and independently coded all messages. The coding is binary. Coders were free to choose as many or few codes as they desired. Coders were not told anything about our hypotheses for the data. The cross-coder correlations for major categories (with one exception) are pretty good – always at least .5 and usually around .7 or .8. Cross-coder correlations around .6 for major categories are what we’ve typically seen in earlier studies. Data reported below is based on whether the category was coded by either coder during a conversation. 1 if we both choose c for the first one we both get ecu 2 Yea 1 F for period 2 2 and then we both can choose f for the second one 2 yeah 1 making my decision 2 and dont backstab 1 hey 2 if we both choose c and then f we get a dollar for the round 1 so i ju