斯科特微观经济学课件Chapter 25 - Public gods, consequences of strategic voting behavior, role of gov.pptVIP

Voting Mechanisms Ideal Conditions Arrow’s impossibility theorem Voting mechanism Determines transitive social preferences Satisfies five conditions Desirable voting mechanism Doesn’t exist Transitive social preferences – attained Abandon desire for democracy * Voting Mechanisms Ideal Conditions Simple majority voting rule Transitive social preferences Restrictions on preferences (condition 2) Single-peaked preferences Voting: one-dimensional issues Preferences - single peaked Uniquely best alternative preferred Preferences decline Increasing distance: best alternative * Figure 25.6 Single-peaked preferences * For each person, alternatives become steadily worse as they get further and further away, in either direction, from the preferred alternative Utility $B 0 Spending Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 The Problem of Vote Manipulation Agenda manipulation Individual – controls committee’s agenda Manipulates: order - pairs of alternatives Influence the outcome Levine-Plott experiment Majority voting rule Intransitive Used – by leader To skew voting * Table 25.4 A preference matrix for a three-person committee * Person Rank of Preference 1 2 3 First Second Third x y z z x y y z x Figure 25.7 Agenda: Levine-Plott agenda manipulation experiment * The Problem of Vote Manipulation Strategic voting Doesn’t reflect true preferences Affect vote’s outcome Strategy: tell truth Not Nash equilibrium strategy * Figure 25.8 Decision tree: player who engages in strategic voting * By lying in the first round of voting, person 1 can ensure that y, his second choice, is elected over z, his third choice, in the second round of voting. The Problem of Vote Manipulation Borda count method Choose: k alternatives Allocation of votes First alternative: k votes Second alternative: k-1 votes Alternative chosen - number total votes Strategy: lie - Nash equilibrium Borda count method Can be manipulated * Table 25.5 A preference matrix for a five-person committee * Person Rank o