博弈论lecture6概要.ppt

博弈论 博弈论 * 博弈论 * Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Complete Information The Problems of Commons Mixed Strategy Equilibrium * 博弈论 * Outline of Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies Nash equilibrium Review of concave functions, optimization Applications of Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy equilibrium * 博弈论 * Today’s Agenda The problems of commons (sec 1.2.D of Gibbons) Mixed strategies Solving matching pennies * 博弈论 * The problems of commons n farmers in a village. Each summer, all the farmers graze their goats on the village green. Let gi denote the number of goats owned by farmer i. The cost of buying and caring for a goat is c, independent of how many goats a farmer owns. The value of a goat is v(G) per goat, where G = g1 + g2 + ... + gn There is a maximum number of goats that can be grazed on the green. That is, v(G)0 if G Gmax, and v(G)=0 if G ? Gmax. Assumptions on v(G): v’(G) 0 and v”(G) 0. Each spring, all the farmers simultaneously choose how many goats to own. * 博弈论 * The problems of commons The normal-form representation: Set of players: { Farmer 1, ... Farmer n} Sets of strategies: Si=[0, Gmax), for i=1, 2,..., n Payoff functions: ui(g1, ..., gn)=gi v(g1 + ...+ gn) – c gi for i = 1, 2, ..., n. * 博弈论 * The problems of commons How to find a Nash equilibrium Find (g1*, g2*, ..., gn*) such that gi* is farmer i’s best response to other farmers’ choices. That is, g1* solves Max u1(g1, g2*, ..., gn*)= g1 v(g1 + g2* ...+ gn*) – c g1 subject to 0 ? g1 Gmaxand g2* solvesMax u2(g1*, g2 , g3*, ..., gn*)= g2v(g1*+g2+g3*+ ...+ gn*)–cg2 subject to 0 ? g2 Gmax ....... * 博弈论 * The problems of commons How to find a Nash equilibrium and gn* solvesMax un(g1*, ..., gn-1*, gn)= gnv(g1*+...+ gn-1*+ gn)–cgn subject to 0 ? gn Gmax ....... * 博弈论 * The problems of commons FOCs: * 博弈论 * The problems of commons How to find a Nas