VentureCapitalContractsKaplanStromberg(2001,2003)学习课件.pptVIP

Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2001, 2003) Table 1 Panel D: Financing amount $4.8 million committed per round $3.8 million provided per round Panel F: Industries Mostly technology based. Panel G: Type of security Convertible preferred stock is most common. Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2000) Table 2 Cash flow rights Fraction of a portfolio company’s equity value that different investors and management have claim to. Panel A VC 50%, Founders 30% Substantial equity ownership on the part of founders/managers is desirable. Founders/managers give up large fraction of ownership to VCs. Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2000) Table 2 Cash flow rights Fraction of a portfolio company’s equity value that different investors and management have claim to. Panel B Pre-revenue round VC stake is 6.1% less in good-performance state. Founder stake is 3.3% more in good-performance state. Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2000) Table 3: Voting rights Percentage of votes that investors and management have to effect corporate decisions. Panel A VCs have a voting majority in 56% of financings when performance is good. VCs have a voting majority in 71% of financings when performance is bad. Panel B Pre-revenue rounds VCs have a voting majority in 66% of financings when performance is good. VCs have a voting majority in 87% of financings when performance is bad. Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2000) Table 4: Board-representation Panel A 6 board members VC has majority of board seats in 26% of cases. Founders have majority in 12% of cases. Neither has majority in 62% of cases. Bad performance board provisions in 15% of cases. Panel C First VC round: VC majority in 11% of cases. Subsequent VC rounds: VC majority in 38% of cases. Venture Capital Contracts: Kaplan-Stromberg (2000) Table 6: Contingencies Extent to which contracts between VCs and entrepreneurs are written contingent on subsequent output, per