B1Ceogenderand.docVIP

Ceo gender and ?rm performance CEO性别和公司业绩 Keywords: Executive compensation, Gender, Performances, Risk aversion 关键词： 高管薪酬，性别，表演，风险规避 abstract Based on a panel of US ?rms over the period of 1992 to 2004, we evaluated whether ?rms managed by female CEOs exhibit the same performance as ?rms managed by male CEOs. We also examined if the gender of the CEO affects the ?rm risk level, and if the com-pensation packages that boards give to female CEOs have less risky components than those given to male CEOs. Our results revealed new insights: on average, the gender of the CEO matters in terms of ?rm performance. When the CEO is a female, the ?rm risk level is smaller than when the CEO is a male. Another important ?nding is that boards are not attending to the risk aversion differences between male and female CEOs when they design the compensation packages, especially equity based com-pensation, which can be understood as an incentive to female CEOs to take risks. 摘要 根据美国企业的小组在1992年至2004年期间，我们评估由女老总管理公司是否具有相同的性能，由男性首席执行官管理的公司。我们还研究了如果CEO的性别会影响公司的风险水平，如果COM补偿封装，电路板给女老总比那些给男性老总风险较低的组成部分。我们的研究结果揭示了新的见解：平均来说，在企业绩效方面的首席执行官事项的性别。当CEO是女性，企业风险水平比当CEO是男性小。另一个重要发现是，板，不参加对男性和女性首席执行官之间的规避风险的不同，当他们设计出的薪酬待遇，特别是基于股权的COM补偿，这可以理解为一种激励女老总去冒险。 1. Introduction Literature shows that gender diversity enhances the monitoring process (Molero, 2011) and should enhance the performance of ?rms seeking growth (Dwyera, Richard, Chadwick, 2003; Krishnan Parsons, 2008). However, whether the gender of the CEO has an impact on the performance of the ?rm has remained an unexplored empirical question. 1。介绍 文献表明，性别多样性增强了监控过程（MOLERO，2011），也应该提高企业寻求增长（Dwyera，理查德和查德威克，2003;克里希南和帕森斯，2008）的表现。然而，行政总裁的性别是否对公司的业绩产生影响一直保持一个未开发的经验问题。 Based on a panel of U.S. ?rms from 1992 to 2004, we examine whether or not the gender of the CEO matters in terms of ?rm performance and in terms of ?rms risk. We also explore if the board awards female CEOs with less risky compensation components, recognizing the fact that women are mor