Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry_ Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform_图文.doc

Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry_ Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform_图文 导读：就爱阅读网友为您分享以下“Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry_ Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform_图文”的资讯，希望对您有所帮助，感谢您对92的支持! the average change in SEO announcement returns following the Reform incremental to that for matched non-SEO firms. Column 1 in Table 9 presents the results from estimating a base-line model that includes only the control variables used in prior analyses. Column 2 in Table 9 presents the full model that includes the additional control variables described above. The table shows that the coefficient for SEOFIRM (β2) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating the stock price of an SEO firm drops by approximately 2.1% at the announcement. This negative reaction is consistent with a long line of prior research (see Ritter [2003] and Eckbo et al. [2007] for surveys of the literature). Importantly, we find that the coefficient estimate for β4 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the SEO announcement return is less severe after the Reform. Specifically, we find that the SEO announcement return is 0.7 percentage points less negative, which provides additional support that there is a reduction in information asymmetry before SEO announcements, and hence the cost of issuing equity capital following the Reform. 6. Conclusion In 2005, the SEC enacted the Securities Offering Reform, which relaxes gun-jumping disclosure rules before equity offerings. The SEC argues that these rules restrict valuable information flow to investors around a highly important corporate event (SEC [2005]). The SEC believes that the relaxation of these restri