a nobel prizefor asymmetric information（诺贝尔prizefor信息不对称）（46页）.docVIP

[Review of Political Economy, forthcoming] A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The Economic Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. James Madison University rosserjb@jmu.edu ABSTRACT This paper reviews the research related to asymmetric information of George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz for which they jointly received the Nobel Prize in Economics for 2001. After a recounting of their overall careers, the history of the asymmetric information idea is presented and then their key papers are discussed. This is followed by an examination of various applications of the concept, including in industrial organization and microeconomic dynamics, efficiency wage theories of unemployment, credit market rationing theory, and issues of economic development and global stability. The degree to which these latter theories can be considered to be truly Keynesian is also considered. The author wishes to acknowledge comments and useful provision of materials by George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz, as well as comments by Steven Pressman and several informants who have requested anonymity. The usual caveat applies. Introduction The 2001 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz for their work on the economic implications of asymmetric information during the 1970s. The press release and the presentation speech by J?rgen Weibull noted specific key papers for each recipient-- Akerlof on the market for lemons (1970), Spence on signaling in labor markets through education (1973), and Stiglitz ( Rothschild, 1976) on self-screening in insurance markets. It is a sign of how important the economics of information