关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响大学毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文.doc

毕 业 设 计（论文） 外 文 文 献 翻 译 文献、资料中文题目：关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响 文献、资料英文题目：The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs 文献、资料来源： 文献、资料发表（出版）日期： 院 （部）： 专 业： 班 级： 姓 名： 学 号： 指导教师： 翻译日期： 2017.02.14 The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs [Abstract] This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis which suggests that increase of leverage may reduce agency costs. Both multivariate tests and univariate tests are employed in this study. The multivariate tests reveal that general relationship between leverage and agency costs is significantly negative. Univariate tests are further used to assess whether agency costs are significantly different when a firm has a relatively higher debt to asset ratio from when it is less leveraged. Similar supporting evidence is found for the agency costs hypothesis. Moreover, results from the univariate tests also indicate that this general negative relationship no longer holds when an extremely high level of leverage is present. [Keywords] Agency costs, Leverage, Agency costs hypothesis, and Opposite effect 1. Introduction In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. The separation of ownership and control may generate agency costs. Two types of agency costs are identified in the paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976): agency costs derived from conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-managers, and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. From then on, a great amount of research has been devoted to demonstrate the interaction between agency costs and financial decisions, governance decisions, dividend policy, and capital structure decisions. Much empirical evidence collected by researchers, for example, Ang et al. (2000), and Fleming et al. (2005), shows that agency costs generated from the conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-manager c