The industrial organization of Congress国会的产业组织.pptVIP

The industrial organization of Congress (Weingast-Marshall) The organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its members.(..) If a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving members’ electoral needs year in and year out they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists. (David Mayhew ) The industrial organization of Congress A huge variety of interests are represented in the legislature and almost none is represented by a majority The diversity of interests creates gains from exchange If public policies reflect a series of bargains among various interests, how are these bargains maintained over time ? Transaction costs 2 problems: Imperfect observability Incompleteness of contracts (moral hazard problem) Three assumptions Vote trading (or logrolling) models, Tullock 1981 Not only porkbarrel politics Pork Barrel programs (distributive policies): benefit flows are contemporaneous to different legislators; Usual legislative instrument to prevent future reneging: omnibus bill However many programs imply: Noncontemporaneous benefit flows Nonsimultaneous exchange Repeat play and reputation: useful but not always sufficient An idealized legislative committee system An idealized legislative committee system Consequences of the idealized legislative committee system on trade enforcement One group of legislators seeks dams and bridges; another wants regulatory benefits. The 2 groups now are in two different committees. The control over the agenda within its jurisdiction implies that a committee has a veto power over the proposal of others Ex post reneging is not possible anymore Consequences of the idealized legislative committee system on the type of policies and the identity of the “gainers” Consequences of the idealized legislative committee system on the type of coalitions Successful coalitions must include the members of the relevant committee Policy and coalitions ar