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第六讲 Extensive games with perfect information: illustrations
Evaluation only.
Created with Aspose.Slides for .NET 3.5 Client Profile 5.2.0.0.
Copyright 2004-2011 Aspose Pty Ltd.
一、Stackelberg’s model of duopoly: constant unit cost and linear inverse demand
Players：the two firms (a leader and a follower)；
Timing：(1)firm 1 chooses a quantity ；(2) firm 2 observes and then chooses a quantity ;
Preferences：Each firm’s preferences are represented by its profit.
Evaluation only.
Created with Aspose.Slides for .NET 3.5 Client Profile 5.2.0.0.
Copyright 2004-2011 Aspose Pty Ltd.
基本假定
Constant unit cost：
Linear inverse demand function：
Assume：
Evaluation only.
Created with Aspose.Slides for .NET 3.5 Client Profile 5.2.0.0.
Copyright 2004-2011 Aspose Pty Ltd.
Backward induction
First compute firm 2’s reaction to an arbitrary quantity by firm 1:
Next firm 1’s problem in the first stage of the game amounts to:
Thus the outcome of the game is:
Evaluation only.
Created with Aspose.Slides for .NET 3.5 Client Profile 5.2.0.0.
Copyright 2004-2011 Aspose Pty Ltd.
Conclusion
The outcome of the equilibrium output is:
Firm 1’s profit is , and firm 2’s profit is .
By contrast, in the unique Nash equilibrium of Cournot’s (simultaneous-move) game under the same assumptions, each firm produces units of output and obtains the profit .Thus firm 1 produces more output and obtains more profit in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game, and firm 2 produces less output and obtains less profit.
Evaluation only.
Created with Aspose.Slides for .NET 3.5 Client Profile 5.2.0.0.
Copyright 2004-2011 Aspose Pty Ltd.
二、Wages and employment in a unionized firm
Players: a firm and a monopoly union;
Timing: the union makes a wage demand w; the firm observes (and accepts) w and then chooses employment L.
Preferences: the payoff of the union is and the payoff of the firm is .
Evaluation only.
Crea
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