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InformationSystemsandPrincipalAgentModels(19页)
Information Systems under Principal-agent Modeling Dr. Chak-Tong Chau 仇澤棠博士 U.S. Fulbright Professor 中美交流富布萊特教授 What Is Information? Broadly defined, information is any device that helps to reduce uncertainty. Alternatively, information should be helpful in: detecting the current state of the world, or forecasting the future state of the world Good Information Should be Useful in: Improving production decisions – telling us to do the right things. Optimizing the scope for risk sharing – so that some people can not make profits by harming other people. Eliminating “information asymmetry” – so that ex ante (before-the-act) private information can be known ex post (after-the-act). Usefulness of Information Usefulness of Information Usefulness of Information Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? Pre-effort “Public” Information? In Conclusion, We cannot guarrantee that people will always do the ethically correct things. Therefore, they will have to be monitored and controlled. Information systems provide us with the means to: inform us what has happened, and motivate people to do the ethically correct things. It is therefore important to consider these points in designing any managerial accounting systems. *Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials * Contract agreed Effort selected Payoff revealed Pre-contract information Pre-effort selection information Post-effort information Post-payoff information Financial reporting Not interesting Post payoff (ex post) Voluntary disclosure – relevation principle Post-effort, pre-payoff Information set under decentralization Post-contract, pre-effort Historical information Agent’s proprietary knowledge Pre-contract To all parties (public) To agent only (private) Information Availability Timing How do we know, a priori, that information is “useful”? Consider the following payoff structure (known to all): 3.3
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