chinesepsyop.pdf

Chinese military analysts have metic-ulously studied the use of armedforce during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest the integration of military strikes and psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that the mass media played during both operations.1 To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare for officers of the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent Chinese military jour- nal China Military Science has published six articles on psychological warfare dur- ing the last two years:2 “On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars,” by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; “The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China,” by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng; “Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strate- gy,” and “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy,” both written by Xu Hezhen; “Comparison of Psychologi- cal Warfare between China and the West,” by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong; and “On Defense in Modern Psy- chological Warfare,” by Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli. With the exception of Wu Juncang, Zhang Qiancheng, Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the authors of the six articles are identified as being instructors at the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, which indi- cates that the academy has an active and influential psychological-warfare depart- ment. In fact, judging by their tone, some of the articles could have been lifted directly from lectures presented during the acade- my’s psychological-warfare courses. The authors of the six articles suggest that at the strategic level, China’s psycho- logical-warfare operations will be charac- terized by coercion, which will take the form of intimidation achieved through demonstrations and shows of force. (Their suggestion supports a recent Pentagon finding that viewed Chinese coercion as the greatest threat to Taiwan.) At the