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Impediments to universal preference-based default theories.pdf

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Impediments to universal preference-based default theories

Reset reproduction of article published in Arti cial Intelligence, Vol. 49, Nos. 1{3 (May 1991), pp.97{128. Reprinted July 1994. Reprinting c Copyright 1989, 1990, 1991, 1994 by Jon Doyle.Impediments to UniversalPreference-Based Default TheoriesJon DoyleLaboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology545 Technology Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139Michael P. WellmanWright Laboratory AI Oce, WL/AAA-1, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433AbstractResearch on nonmonotonic and default reasoning has identi ed several important criteriafor preferring alternative default inferences. The theories of reasoning based on each of thesecriteria may uniformly be viewed as theories of rational inference, in which the reasonerselects maximally preferred states of belief. Though researchers have noted some casesof apparent con ict between the preferences supported by di erent theories, it has beenhoped that these special theories of reasoning may be combined into a universal logic ofnonmonotonic reasoning. We show that the di erent categories of preferences con ict morethan has been realized, and adapt formal results from social choice theory to prove thatevery universal theory of default reasoning will violate at least one reasonable principleof rational reasoning. Our results can be interpreted as demonstrating that, within thepreferential framework, we cannot expect much improvement on the rigid lexicographicpriority mechanisms that have been proposed for con ict resolution.1 IntroductionThe proliferation of formalisms for nonmonotonic inference [16] attests to a diverse set ofmethods for reasoning by default. These include circumscriptive inference [29, 31, 35], whichdraws those conclusions valid in all minimal models of a set of axioms; autoepistemic infer-ence [39, 42] and default logic [49], which permit rules of inference to refer to unprovablestatements as well as provable ones; speci city-based taxonomic inference [60], which makesassumptions based

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