需求和成本同时扰动时多零售商供应链协调.pdfVIP

第 30 卷第 10 期 系统工程理论与实践 Vo 1.30 , No. lO 2010年 10 月 Systems Engineering 一 Theory Practice Oct. , 2010 文章编号: 1000-6788(2010)10- 1753户09 中图分类号: F224岛 F406.7 文献标志码:A 需求和成本同时扰动时多零售商供应链协调 曹二保12，赖明勇口 (1.湖南大学经济与贸易学院7 长沙 410079; 2. 湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室，长沙 410079) 摘要分析一个供应商和 n 个 Bertrand 竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明 收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应 商的生产成本同时发生扰动时，供应链的协调被打破，通过求解突发事件下供应链系统最优利润的 Kuhn- Tucker (KT) 条件，提出了供应链在一体化时应对突发事件的最优策略;进一步证明了改进 的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本同时扰动的分权供应链;最后数值实验表明了模型的有效性. 关键词 收益共享;供应链管理;突发事件;协调机制;博弈 Coordination mechanism of supply chain including multiple retailers when demand and cost 盯e disrupted CAO Er-bω1， 2， LAI Ming-yongL2 (1. College of Economics andτh巾， Hunan University, Changsha 410079 , China; 2. Hunan Province Laboratory of LogisticB Information and Simulation T，配hnology， Changsha 410079 , China) Abstract The coordination problem of a supply chain with one supplier and n Bertrand competing retailers was analyzed. It was proved that a revenue sharing contract can be used to coordinate the supply chain under normal environment. But the coordination may be broken off by demand scale and cost disruptions , and the optimal strategies that the centralized decision-making supply chain replied to the disruptions were proposed by solving the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) condition of optimal profit of supply chain system under disruptions. It was further proved that an improved revenue sharing contr缸t can be used to coordinate the decentralized decision-making supply chain when demands and costs were disrupted simultaneously. Finally, a numerical example w:回 pres