股权再融资门槛变迁与政策诱导型盈余管理——基于双重倍差法的经验研究.pdfVIP

中国软科学 2014 年第 8 期 股权再融资门槛变迁与政策诱导型盈余管理 一一基于双重倍差法的经验研究 黄晓薇，郭敏 (对外经济贸易大学金融学院，北京 1仪即29) 摘 要:从股权再融资中上市公司所面临的财务门槛约束的视角出发，本文运用双重倍差法考察了政府对于再 融资的干预行为，并且重点分析是否存在外部政策变动对于企业盈余管理的诱导性，及其在配股制度变迁下这 种诱导性的动态变化。研究发现:配股制度的财务门槛诱导的盈余管理行为降低了企业的长期绩效，随着财务 门槛制度的放松，企业盈余管理行为明显减弱。上述结果说明了政府的干预行为扭曲资本市场的资源配置，非 但不是一种有效的筛选优质公司进行再融资的机制，反而诱导了企业的盈余管理冲动，并在长期内损害了企业 的价值，从而降低了整个社会资源配置的效率。 关键词:配股;盈余管理;财务门槛;倍差法 中图分类号:F321. 42 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1∞2 -9753(2014 )08 -0162-11 Threshold Constraints in Equity Retinancing and Policy-Induced Earning Mangement: A Empirical Study ßased on DitTerence in DitTerence Method HUANG Xiao-wei , GUO Min (ScJwol 01 Banking Finance , University olInternational Business and Economic ,Beijing 1仪旧29 ， China ) Abstract: Based on the financial threshold constraints imposed on Chinese listed companies during rights issue , this paper , by using difference-in-difference metbods , tries to shed light upon the relationship between government intervention on refinancing and policy-induced earnings management ,as well as the dynamic influences of transitions of rights issue system. We find that earnings management induced by financial threshold in rights issue reduces companies long-run perfoπnance. Furthermore , with the loosening of financial threshold , the influence of the financial threshold constraints reduced significantly. Our results illustrate that government intervention distorts resource allocation in capital markets ,which is not a good way for selecting superior firms. Instead ,it induces earning management ,reduces firm value , and reduces the efficiency of resource allocation. Key words: rights issue; earnings management; financial threshol