存款的道德风险(国外英语资料).docVIP

存款的道德风险(国外英语资料) Since the Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency (FDIC) in 1933 by the famous Glass Stig Apha, the deposit insurance system has been widely adopted internationally. However, in 1980s the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the defect completely unmasked the deposit insurance system. Usually, the crisis is mainly attributed to the moral hazard caused by the deposit insurance system and the regulatory forbearance of the insurance mechanism. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation mainly due to regulatory forbearance: one is its lack of adequate loan insurance funds to close insolvent and pay the deposit; two is the relationship between the regulators with the supervision object is too close; three insurance institutions would cover problems, expect the problem will go away. In fact, these factors almost plague the deposit insurance system in all countries. They not only aggravate the moral hazard, but also weaken the efficiency of deposit insurance. First, the defects of deposit insurance system and its moral risks First, deposit insurance sometimes leads to the accumulation of financial risks. As is known to all, bank failures are often caused by the operators mistakes. If the financial regulatory authorities shut down the banks before they were in trouble, they could reduce many unnecessary losses. However, some executives tend to delay the handling of troubled banks in order to achieve their personal ends. In the establishment of a deposit insurance system, if the banks problems were not significantly exposed, they try to bring it off, because they think that taxpayers are scattered collective, it is difficult to effectively take collective actions. Some regulators deliberately confuse the interests of their representatives and see themselves as custodian of the banking industry. Individual regulators believe that a smooth financial system of their own can best improve their reputation in the financial sector. As a result, they try