产业转移中的政府间竞争博弈及其化解策略——基于两广地区间产业转移的实证分析.pdfVIP

第22卷第5期 梧 州 学 院 学 报 No．5Vo1．22 2012年10月 JOURNAL OF WUZHOU UNIVERSITY 0ct．2012 产业转移中的政府间竞争博弈及其化解策略 — — 基于两广地区间产业转移的实证分析 吴 方 (广西师范大学 漓江学院，广西 桂林 541006) 【摘 要】当前两广地区间产业转移与合作的竞争博弈激烈，根据博弈论中的 “囚徒困境”模型，缺少外部化解途径即 通过强制性的外部机制的存在，政府间竞争博弈必然降低产业合作绩效。为突破这种 “囚徒困境”并实现竞争中的协作共 存，需要切实地改变博弈者的效用结构，即加大未来对博弈者的 “威胁”与 “利诱”，进一步形成与完善博弈者之间的互惠 协作机制 [关键词】两广；产业转移；地方政府；竞争博弈；协作机制 [中图分类号】F262 [文献标识码】A 【文章编号】1673—8535(2012)05—0026—05 Game of Competition between Governments during Industrial Transfer and Solutions to It _— — An Empirical Analysis Based on Regional Industrial Transfer 一between Guangdong and Guangxl_～ 一 一_一 - Wu Fang (Lijing College，Guangxi Normal University，Guilin 541006，China) Abstract：There is an intense competition between governments of Guangdong and Guangxi during the course of regional indus— trial transfer and cooperation．According to the game theory of”Prisoner’S Dilemma” model，being in lack of external solutions，or by implementing mandatory external mechanisms，intergovernmental competition will inevitably reduce governments’performance in industrial cooperation．In order to break through the”Prisoner’S Dilemma” and achieve collaboration and CO-existence in the competition，it is necessary to change the utility structure of the game，to increase the players’ “threat’’ and “will” ，form and perfect a cooperation mechanism of mutual benefit between the players． Key words：Guangdong and Guangxi；industrial transfer；local government；competition game；cooperation mechanism． 一 、 问题的提出 快，将失去竞争优势的部分产业向经济欠发达地区 近年来，珠三角地区产业结构调整与升级加 转移已是必然趋势。然而，产业的跨区域运动过程