对博弈解概念认知和理性条件的逻辑分析.pdfVIP

Vo l. 37 No.5 第 37 卷第5 期 计算机科学 2010 年 5 月 Computer Science May 2010 对博弈解概念认知和理性条件的逻辑分析 蒋军利蔚晓黯 (西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心 重庆 400715) 摘 要 在博弈求解中参与者放假定为理性的，即总是追求其最大期望效用。但这一理性假设在博弈论中没有一个 很清晰的形式定义，通常是把主体问对理性的相互认识假设为公共知识(common knowledge). 然而这样的做法具体 到某个博弈，尤其是有限博弈，就会显得粗糙，所涉及的战条问题也为系统复杂度的计算造成阁难。其实，在叫个具体 的有限博弈G 中，只需要有限次的嵌套。~于此形式化地分析了某接算法所要求的具体的认知和理性条件，提出了 一种满足强理性条件的博养求解可行算法。另外，通过在公开宣告l!辑中不断地宣告各种强度的理性概念，同样可以 得到相应博弈算法求解的结果。 关键诩 Z史性，算法，共知识，公开宣令 Logic Study of Epistemic and Rational Conditions of Some Game-theoretic Solutions JIANG Jun-Ji TANG Xiao-jia CInstitute of Logic and Intelligence ,Southwest University ,Chongqing 400715 ,China) Abstract ln the process of 自.eeking for game-thωreticωlutions， players are supposed to be rational which means that theya 1l tend to rnaximize their expected payo{fs. However ,there is no a definitely definition of rationality in the game theory and the usual assumption of mutual knowledge of individual rationality to be common knowledge is coarse and rnaybe tωstrong， especially when the game is finite. in fact ,the nested degree of interactive knowledge of individual ra- tionality has a rnaxirnal value that we will show. In this paper we formalized the special ratíonality conditíons for 创ch solution algorithm that we modified for the sake of prograr孔One the other hand ,we proposed an algorithm喃ωlution in correspondence wíth strong ratíonality. Moreover ,we showed that iterated announcement of the rationality we defined could arríve exactly at the algorithm-solution ,correspondingly. Keyw伽由 Rationalíty ,Algorithm. Common knowledge ,Public announceme