基于公平偏好理论激励机制探究.docVIP

基于公平偏好理论激励机制探究摘 要:传统经济学的理性人假设在许多情况下与现实不符,行为人并非单纯追求自身利益的最大化,而是还会关注收益的公平性。本文研究引入行为经济学中行为人具有公平偏好的研究结论,运用心理规律弱化理性假设,改进并构建新的委托―代理模型,研究代理人关注物质效用和公平分配情况下的最优激励契约和激励效率。模型分析结果表明,公平偏好会改变最优契约的报酬结构形式,影响激励的效率;在公平条件下建立的新互惠契约是一种帕累托改进,并且是激励、保险、公平三者之间相互平衡的契约。 关键词:激励机制;委托―代理;公平偏好;契约理论 中图分类号:F019 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1003-5192(2010)03-0006-06 On Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference PU Yong-jian?1, GUO Xin-yi?1, CHEN Bin?2 (1.College of Economics and Business Administration, Chong Qing University, Chongqing 400044, China; 2.School of ?Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 999077, China) Abstract:The traditional economics was based on the hypothetical proposition of which an agent is pure rational, and in many cases, this proposition against to the actual situation. The empirical studies on behavioral economics indicated that all people are not egoistical, but they not only pursue their private profits but also are concerned about whether they get a fair income. According to this fairness-preference premise of behavioral economics, this paper uses psychological regularity to weaken rational assumption of economics and then attempts to improve and build a new principal-agent model. Based on this model, we study the incentive contracts and incentive efficiency of agent who is concerned about the material utility and fair distribution. The results from these researches prove that the fair preference has influences on the structure and efficiency of incentive contracts, and the new reciprocal contract based on fairness is a Pareto improvement and prompts a balance among incentive, insurance and fairness. Key words:incentive mechanism; principal-agent; fairness preference; contract theory 1 引言 委托―代理理论(Principal-Agent Theory)主要研究信息不对称时存在道德风险的激励机制设计[1,2],为组织经济学[3]和人力资源管理[4]提供了一个重要的分析框架。该理论延用传统经济学的理性人假设作为基本前提,即人们具有自利偏好(Self-Interest Preference),追求自身利益的最大化。但众多实证研究表明,代理人并不只关注自身的利益,还关注所获得利益是否公平,而这种对分配公平的关注会影响代理人的行为反映和努力程度。本文以Holmstrom和Milgrom委托