地方官员的培养 - 中山大学岭南学院.pdf

地方官员的培养 ――来自我国京官交流的证据 徐现祥 王贤彬 中山大学岭南学院 内容摘要：现有文献通常认为地方官员在我国经济发展中扮演着积极角色，但并没有涉及， 地方政府官员推动经济发展的领导能力是如何培养的。本文发现，从中央各部委交流到地方 任职的省长省委书记（民间称之为京官）是一个自然的观测平台，因为京官交流是“培养” 与“使用”相结合。因此，本文收集整理了 1978-2005 年间我国京官交流样本，构造了京官 与省区相匹配的面板数据，采用倍差法系统识别地方官员的培养，结果发现，京官交流是以 培养为主，培养成本是辖区经济增长显著放慢了 1 个百分点左右；从初次分配的角度看，京 官的培养学费主要是由政府支付的；一个任期的培养锻炼结束后，无论是从政治晋升还是经 济增长角度看，培养后的绩效显著提高。 关键词：京官交流；经济增长；倍差法 Cultivating local official ：Evidences from China Abstract: The traditional wisdom holds that the local officials play active roles in the process of economic development in China. If so, how are they qualified? We find a special kind of governors who are transferred from the central to the local with the purpose of cultivation, and usually labeled as jingguan . The transferredjingguan accounts for 15% of all governors in China, and can be treated as a natural experiments to systematically investigate the accumulation of the competence of Chinese local officials. On the basis of thejingguan - province matched panel data, we find several strong evidences that the cost of cultivation is about 1 percentage of slowdown in the economic growth in which they govern, most of which, from the perspective of the primary distribution, is burdened by the government. It’s not surprising we also find that the cultivation yields significantly considerable improvements in the possibility of political promotion as well as economic performance. Our findings are robust, and might shed some highlights on the understanding of how the local officials are cultivated in China. Keywords:jingguan transfer; political economic growth; difference in differences JEL Classification: P160; O110 联系方式 中山大学岭南学院（510275 ） 徐现祥 电话： 020